Adam Smith and William James on the psychological basis of progress by Glaze, Simon
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Glaze, Simon (2017) Adam Smith and William James on the psychological basis of progress. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics , 41 (2(2)). pp. 349-365. 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/80493 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in 
Cambridge Journal of Economics following peer review. The version of record [insert 
complete citation information here] is available online at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cje/bew043 
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP URL’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adam Smith and William James on the psychological basis of progress 
 
Article accepted for publication in Cambridge Journal of Economics July 2016 
DOI: 10.1093/cje/bew043 
 
 
 
Simon Glaze 
Department of Politics and International Studies 
The University of Warwick 
Coventry 
CV4 7AL, UK 
 
S.Glaze@warwick.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Adam Smith and William James on the psychological basis of progress 
 
Abstract 
This paper identifies extensive connections between Adam Smith’s and William James’s 
accounts of the psychological basis of intellectual, material and moral progress.  These 
connections are brought into focus through discussion of their shared circumspection towards 
claims to objective truth, which highlights Smith’s distance from mainstream interpretations of 
his contributions to economics.  The paper additionally argues that insight into the sustained 
emphases that Smith and James place upon the role of psychological satisfaction as a 
motivating factor in societal and personal progress can aid current efforts to draw upon their 
work and to reconcile the disciplines that they are widely credited with founding.    
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1. Introduction 
The ongoing relationship between economics and psychology is an issue of longstanding 
interest (e.g., Bruni and Sugden 2007; Clark 1918; Davis 2011; Dow 2011; Earl 2005; Hands 
2010; Kahneman 2003; Lewin 1996; Lunt 1996; Moscati 2013; Sent 2004; Simon 1959).  
While interest in the contributions of the widely acknowledged founders of these disciplines - 
Adam Smith and William James - also continues to flourish across the academy, comparisons 
between their thought are notably scarce.1  This paper demonstrates the central yet often 
overlooked emphases that Smith and James place upon the psychological basis of intellectual, 
material and moral progress.  This is shown through extensive quotations from their works, 
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which emphasise the psychological foundations of some of their more well-known concepts 
including Smith’s invisible hand and impartial spectator metaphors and James’s pragmatist 
philosophy.  This approach demonstrates Smith’s distance from neoclassical economics’ 
axiomatic conceptualisation of individuals as rational utility maximising economic agents as 
well as the sustained emphasis that he and James place upon the role of imaginative appeals to 
orderly systems of natural and social phenomena in individual and societal development. 2  
Smith’s and James’s accounts of the influence of such appeals upon the generation of 
philosophical systems are discussed in the next section of the paper, where I additionally 
evaluate James’s pragmatist theory of truth.  In the following section I discuss the significance 
that both figures place upon the role of individuals’ imaginative processes in material and moral 
progress.  I consider this in relation to Smith’s invisible hand metaphor and his discussion of 
the origins and benefits of the division of labour, which emphasises further dissimilarities to 
mainstream interpretations of his work.  This divergence is also evident in my evaluation in the 
penultimate section of the paper of Smith’s and James’s mediation between subjectivism and 
objectivism, which highlights their moves beyond both neoclassical economics’ assumptions 
regarding individuals’ behaviour and Thorstein Veblen’s institutionalist critique of these.   
 
While it is known that James owned a copy of the second edition of The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (TMS) and had read Smith prior to the publication of his own The Principles of 
Psychology (PP) in 1890 (Skrupskelis and Berkeley, 1993, p. 93; ibid, p.94, footnote 6), it is 
not the aim of this paper to investigate if or to what extent he is influenced by Smith.  The 
extensive connections that I identify here between Smith’s and James’s contributions instead 
emphasise the central importance that they each place upon psychological satisfaction as a 
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motivating factor in the development of intellectual, material and moral progress and upon the 
open-ended nature of the processes through which such progress occurs.  In so doing the paper 
clarifies substantial yet hitherto unnoticed points of connection between Smith’s and James’s 
seminal contributions to economics and psychology that can be fruitfully considered by 
scholars who seek to draw upon their contributions and integrate insights from these disciplines 
in order to transcend reductive accounts of individuals’ economic behaviour. 
 
2. The psychological basis of intellectual progress 
The significance of psychological processes is a recurring motif in Smith’s work, as is evinced 
in his account of the origins and development of philosophical systems in The History of 
Astronomy (HA) (Smith, 1980, HA, IV.26; 55-67; Kubo, 2014).  Notably, this is where the 
invisible hand metaphor first appears in Smith’s writings in his explanation that, prior to these 
systems being established, “the irregular events of nature” were ascribed to the favour or 
displeasure of imagined deities such as “the invisible hand of Jupiter” (Smith, 1980, HA, III.2).   
Smith further suggests here that whilst more sophisticated philosophical explanations of such 
phenomena emerge “when law has established order and security, and subsistence ceases to be 
precarious” (ibid, III.3) they are prompted by individuals’ needs to avoid psychological 
discomfort caused by “events which follow one another in an uncommon order”:  
 
Nature...seems to abound with events which appear solitary and incoherent with all that 
go before them, which therefore disturb the easy movement of the imagination… 
Philosophy, by representing the invisible chains which bind together all these disjointed 
objects, endeavours to introduce order into this chaos of jarring and discordant 
appearances, to allay this tumult of the imagination, and to restore it...to that tone of 
5 
 
tranquillity and composure, which is both agreeable in itself, and most suitable to its 
nature (ibid, II.10; II.12). 
 
Smith emphasises the importance of a similar psychological process in the adoption of new 
philosophical systems in Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, where he suggests that the 
Newtonian method of “lay[ing] down certain principles known or proved in the beginning, 
from whence we account for severall Phenomena, connected by the same Chain” provides “far 
superior” instances of psychological pleasure than those that are derived from “the unconnected 
method where everything is accounted for by itself”.  Smith additionally explains that the 
former method was first employed by Descartes, which led to his philosophy being “universally 
received by all the Learned in Europe” for around a century despite it having “no...sort of 
resemblance to the truth”.3  It is therefore ironic that attachment to the psychological pleasure 
derived from the Cartesian system’s capacity to “sooth the imagination” generated resistance 
to Newton’s universal law of gravitation, which Smith describes as “the greatest and most 
admirable improvement that was ever made in philosophy” (Smith, 1980, HA, II.12; IV.67; 
IV.76).  Yet there is a further irony: Smith additionally notes that the appeal of Newton’s 
system also depends in part upon its ability to appear less “an attempt to connect in the 
imagination the phaenomena of the Heavens, but as the greatest discovery that was ever made 
by man”.  In so doing, Smith reminds us that philosophical systems are not synonymous with 
that which they are attempting to explain, but are instead “mere inventions of the imagination” 
which “connect together in the fancy those different movements and effects which are in reality 
already performed” (ibid, IV.76; IV.19; see Kim, 2012, p. 813).   
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While the extent of Newton’s influence upon Smith’s philosophy of science is much debated 
(see Berry 2006), his psychological explanation of the origins and development of systems of 
science and philosophy - terms which he employs interchangeably in HA - reflects Smith’s 
circumspection towards claims to objective knowledge based upon existing explanations in his 
more well-known works (e.g., Smith, 1976 [1790], VI.ii.2.17-8; Smith, 1976 [1776], II.iii.36).  
This can be compared directly to James’s observations regarding the role of such explanations 
in resolving psychological discomfort and in potentially obscuring both newer systems of 
thought and the provisional nature of knowledge generated therein.  As he states in The Hidden 
Self (James, 1890, p.361): “The ideal of every science is that of a closed and completed system 
of truth…and, so far from free is most men’s fancy, that when a consistent and organised 
scheme of this sort has once been comprehended and assimilated, a different scheme is 
unimaginable”.  James again stresses the provisional nature of such systems in Pragmatism, 
where he observes: “Ptolemaic astronomy, euclidean space, aristotelian logic, scholastic 
metaphysics, were expedient for centuries, but human experience has boiled over those limits, 
and we now call all of these things only relatively true” (James, 1987 [1907], p. 584).  Echoing 
Smith’s account of the origins of philosophical systems in HA, James relates this progress to 
the psychological processes through which claims to truth are generated: 
 
The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a new experience that 
puts them to strain… The result is an inward trouble to which his mind till then had 
been a stranger, and from which he seeks to escape by modifying his previous mass of 
opinions...until at last some new idea comes up which he can graft upon the ancient 
stock with a minimum of disturbance of the latter… This new idea is then adopted as 
the true one... To a certain degree, therefore, everything here is plastic (ibid, pp. 512-
3). 
7 
 
Harvey Cormier (2000, p. xii) notes that James’s alleged preoccupation with “trivial and 
impossibly subjectivistic explanations of meaning and truth” is criticised by Bertrand Russell 
and Antonio Gramsci for ignoring, and thus helping to justify, political oppression.  Despite 
praising James as deserving “a high place among philosophers”, Russell “find[s] great 
intellectual difficulties” in the “subjectivistic madness” of James’s pragmatic view that ideas 
“become true in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our 
experience” (Russell, 1946, pp. 812-8; see Sprigge 1997).  A further critique of James’s alleged 
variant of pragmatism is provided by Gramsci (1971, pp. 372-3):   
 
Take the pragmatist principle as expounded by James: “The best way of discussing the 
various points of any theory is to start by establishing what practical difference would 
result if one or other of the alternatives were the true one”.  One can see from this the 
immediacy of the philosophical politicism of the pragmatists... [who], at most, have 
contributed to... the justification of conservative and reactionary movements.   
 
As Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith explain, Gramsci’s interpretation of James’s 
pragmatism appears instead to be a précis of his own summary of Charles Sanders Peirce’s 
version of the method in The Varieties of Religious Experience (VRE).4  While James dedicated 
his earlier The Will to Believe (WB) to Peirce, their versions of pragmatism should not be 
conflated.5  Jack Barbalet (2004, p. 338) notes that Peirce first introduced the term in The 
Fixation of Belief (1877) in order to represent “a logical method for going beyond formalism 
and abstraction”.  While James refers to this in Philosophical Conceptions and Practical 
Results (1992 [1898]) it was not until the publication of his The Pragmatic Method (1904) that 
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wider interest in pragmatism began to be established.  Here, James seeks to define the principle 
“more broadly than Mr. Peirce expresses it.  The ultimate test for us of what a truth means is 
indeed the conduct it dictates or inspires.  But it inspires that conduct because it first foretells 
some particular turn to our experience” (James, 1904, p. 674; see also James, 1987 [1907], 
pp.506-7).  As Barbalet (2004, p. 338) further explains, James’s articulation of pragmatism as 
a psychological rather than purely logical method prompted Peirce to rename his version 
“pragmaticism”, which Robert Lane (2007, p. 252) argues indicates a modal shift in Peirce’s 
later thought towards a realist explanation of truth that he claims is obtainable via empirical 
investigation.6     
 
According to Israel Scheffler, Peirce “deplored James’s notion of the ‘mutability of truth’ as a 
‘seed of death’ that has been allowed to infect pragmatism”.7 However, as Hilary Putnam 
(1997, pp. 170-181) notes, Peirce’s constitutive account of absolute truth is shared by James, 
which he describes in The Meaning of Truth (MT) as an “ideal set of formulations towards 
which all opinions may in the long run of experience be expected to converge”.  While he does 
not share Peirce’s (e.g., 1958) conviction that this “ultimate consensus” will ever be reached, 
James acknowledges that it is an expedient concept: “To admit, as we pragmatists do, that we 
are liable to correction…involves the use on our part of an ideal standard” (James, 1987 [1911], 
pp. 958-9 [emphasis in original]).  Indeed, he additionally claims in WB that: “when as 
empiricists we give up the doctrine of objective certitude, we do not thereby give up the quest 
or hope of truth itself” (James, 1992 [1896], p. 468).  Therefore, while James rejects that truth 
is “an inert static relation” and instead “becomes true, is made true by events”, his account does 
not collapse into absolute subjectivism as, in his version of pragmatism, true ideas must be 
verifiable (James, 1987 [1907], pp. 573-4 [emphasis in original]).  James thus shares with 
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Smith a cautious outlook towards claims to objective truth whilst neglecting to postulate that it 
cannot exist (ibid, pp. 583-4; Smith 1976 [1790], VII.ii.4.14).  Instead, as James states in MT: 
“there can be no truth if there is nothing to be true about...This is why as a pragmatist I have 
so carefully postulated ‘reality’ ab initio, and why, throughout my whole discussion, I remain 
an epistemological realist” (James, 1987 [1911], p. 925).   
 
3. The psychological basis of material and moral progress 
While James mediates between absolute subjectivism and absolute objectivism, his earliest 
definition of philosophy as “the possession of mental perspective” in The Teaching of 
Philosophy in our Colleges (1978 [1876]) is reflected in his articulations of psychology, 
pragmatism, pluralism and radical empiricism.8  In PP James argues that the development of 
such perspective in moral terms involves reflection by individuals upon the likely reception 
afforded to them by their imagined “ideal spectator” and their peers.  While this is portrayed 
as an intersubjective process, James further claims that it is the introspective aspects of 
“spiritual self-seeking” which assists personal moral development most directly and enables 
individuals to be “inwardly strengthened” in the event of societal disapproval (James, 1950a 
[1890], pp. 308-10; pp. 315-6 [emphasis in original]).  Clear parallels may be drawn between 
this aspect of James’s thought and Smith’s account of moral self-determination in TMS, where 
he employs the impartial spectator metaphor to illustrate the psychological processes through 
which individuals engage in imaginative reflection upon the propriety of their own and others’ 
motivations via “the tribunal of their own consciences…the man within the breast, the great 
judge and arbiter of their conduct” (Smith, 1976 [1790], I.i.4.8; III.ii.32).   
 
Smith (ibid, IV.i.6-11) additionally claims that such psychological processes are centrally 
important to “the order of society” as they inform individuals’ efforts to emulate the “happiness 
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and tranquillity” that they imagine the rich to enjoy from having the means to satisfy their 
“frivolous desires”.  He also explains that, while only “contemptible and trifling” satisfaction 
can be derived from the imagined “pleasures of wealth and greatness”, these are recommended 
to us via our natural psychological propensity to conflate them “in the imagination with the 
order, the regular and harmonious movement of the system, the machine or oeconomy by 
means of which it is produced”.  Smith thus contends that this psychological deception is “often 
the secret motive of the most important pursuits of both private and public life”, as it “rouses 
and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind” (Smith, 1976 [1790], IV.i.6-10).  It is 
therefore significant that he refers to the invisible hand metaphor for the second time in his 
oeuvre here in a discussion of the inadvertent effects of the consumption of luxury goods by 
landowners for “the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires”.  According to Smith, 
these individuals additionally imagine that they can consume their entire harvest but in reality 
“consume little more than the poor”.  Consequently, they:   
 
...divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements.  They are led by an 
invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which 
would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its 
inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of 
the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species (ibid, IV.i.10).   
 
Smith makes a similar claim in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(WN): 
  
The desire of food is limited in every man by the narrow capacity of the human stomach; 
but the desire of conveniencies and ornaments...seems to have no limit... Those, 
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therefore, who have the command of more food than they themselves can consume, are 
always willing to exchange the surplus... for gratifications of this other kind... The poor, 
in order to obtain food, exert themselves to gratify those fancies of the rich... Hence 
arises a demand for every sort of material which human invention can employ (Smith 
1976 [1776], I.xi.c.7).   
 
Smith invokes the unintended societal benefits of a similar psychological tendency via the 
invisible hand metaphor in Book IV of WN, where he famously argues that merchants, investors 
and tradesmen unintentionally “promote the publick interest” in their search for profit (Smith, 
1976 [1776], IV.ii.9).  This incarnation of the invisible hand often appears in influential 
economists’ portrayals of Smith as a founding advocate of market fundamentalism, the fervent 
rejection of state interference in the economy that is associated with neoliberal economic 
ideology (e.g., Taylor and Mankiw, 2014; see Ahmad, 1990; Pack 1991; Soros 1998; Stiglitz 
2009; Winch 1997; Wrenn 2015).  This is reflected in Paul Samuelson’s (1998 [1948], p. 36) 
claim that the invisible hand denotes Smith’s alleged doctrinaire advocacy of free markets; a 
view that is echoed in Thomas Piketty’s (2014, p. 9) assertion that the metaphor indicates that 
Smith “saw the market as a self-regulated system...capable of achieving equilibrium of its own 
without major deviations”.  Yet Smith is not an advocate of market fundamentalism, and does 
not present the economy as a self-regulating system (e.g., Smith 1976 [1776], I.ix.2; I.ix.10; 
I.xi.d).  Instead, such influential interpretations of the invisible hand seemingly neglect the 
psychological aspects of the discussion in which the metaphor appears in WN, wherein Smith 
explains that merchants tend to prefer to invest domestically due to the “uneasiness...which he 
feels at being separated so far from his capital” (ibid, IV.ii.6).  According to Smith, it is this 
desire for psychological comfort allied to economic self-interest that inadvertently contributes 
to societal prosperity:  
12 
 
By preferring the support of domestick to that of foreign industry, he intends to his own 
security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the 
greatest value, he intends to his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led 
by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention (ibid, IV.ii.9). 
 
Smith additionally contends here that such behaviour only contributes to societal wellbeing 
when the wealth generated via such activities is kept within the country in which it is invested 
(Grampp 2000, p. 444).  That this caveat and its attendant psychological processes are 
consistently overlooked in mainstream interpretations of the invisible hand is additionally 
surprising given that the latter mechanism is also a central feature of his discussion of the 
efficiency of commercial society in Book I of WN, where he observes: “man has almost 
constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their 
benevolence only”.  A more familiar exposition of this argument is evident in his succeeding 
claim that: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” (Smith, 1976 [1776], I.ii.2).  
Whilst this sentence is frequently, and erroneously, cited as evidence of Smith’s advocacy of 
selfish behaviour (Clark, 1992, pp. 186-7), it instead demonstrates the central importance that 
he places upon the psychological processes through which individuals imaginatively 
reconstruct others’ interests and address these accordingly (Fleischacker, 1999, p. 170).  
Indeed, Smith employs his observation about the butcher, brewer, and baker to illustrate the 
central importance of this persuasive faculty, which he claims is the foundation of individuals’ 
natural disposition to “truck, barter and exchange one thing for another”; a trait which he 
identifies as the both the cause of the division of labour and the source of “the greater part of 
those mutual good offices which we stand in need of” (Smith, 1976 [1776], I.ii.1-3).  
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Smith further explains that this disposition and the “difference of talents” that it generates 
contributes towards material progress.  As he contends here: “The difference between the most 
dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems 
to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education”  (ibid, I.ii.4-5).  Smith 
again refers to these figures in Lectures on Jurisprudence, where he asserts that such processes 
also contribute towards scientific advances: “The porter is of use in carrying burthens for the 
philosopher, and in his turn he burns his coals cheaper by the philosopher’s invention of the 
fire machine”.  As with the butcher, brewer, baker and their customers, therefore: “The 
philosopher and porter are both of advantage to each other” (Smith, 1978, LJ [B], II.219-221).  
This process is consistent with Smith’s optimism regarding individuals’ potential to improve 
their moral capabilities via commercial interaction and introspection.   Intellectual, material 
and moral advances are thus intimately connected to psychological effort and sympathetic 
sociability by Smith, through which he claims just and efficient exchange can be realised more 
readily.  As he further contends in WN, the “uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every 
man to better his condition” increases commercial activity and subsequently creates new social 
bonds with those outside of one’s immediate social circles (Smith 1976 [1776], I.ii.2-3; 
II.iii.31).  As this process depends upon deeper imaginative reflection regarding others’ 
motives and interests, it thus incentivises the development of one’s abilities to persuade others 
and to sympathise with their interests while aiding the effective recognition and pursuit of one’s 
own.   
 
This account is echoed in TMS, where Smith suggests that similar psychological efforts 
potentially facilitate greater awareness of one’s interests being “connected with the prosperity 
of society”.  Notably, it is here that Smith defines his centrally important concept of sympathy 
as “fellow-feeling”, which he describes as a source of psychological pleasure akin to that 
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obtained from the contemplation of convincing philosophical schemas and of the “orderly and 
flourishing state” (Smith, 1976 [1790], I.i.1.5).  These observations along with those regarding 
individuals’ aversion to psychological “disorder and confusion” (ibid, II.ii.3.6) and their 
recognition of commercial society’s interdependent nature are thus wholly consistent with his 
provisional characterisations of the development of intellectual, material and moral progress.  
Indeed, while Smith consistently emphasises the role of imaginative striving in personal and 
societal development, he does not do so in teleological terms.  As Knud Haakonssen (2006, pp. 
4-6) argues, Smith instead recognises that: “Because of the individuality and, not least, the 
uncertainty of human life, it is impossible to formulate a universal idea of the highest good or 
the good life”.  A similarly persuasive claim is made by Richard Olson:   
 
…since Smith’s doctrine…measures the value of philosophical systems solely in 
relation to their satisfaction of the human craving for order, it sets up a human rather 
than an absolute or natural standard for science, and it leaves all science essentially 
hypothetical… Smith implied that unceasing change rather than permanence must be 
the characteristic of philosophy.9 
 
4. The provisional nature of knowledge 
Smith’s account of the psychological basis and provisional nature of intellectual and moral 
criteria clearly demonstrates his distance from the “epistemologically absolute, 
methodologically deductive, ethically…and behaviourally individualistic” tenets of 
neoclassical economics that its exponents often ascribe to his work (Winrich 1984: 994; see 
Grampp 1948, p. 315; Montes 2004, pp. 150-2).  According to Nicholas Vriend “the 
fundamental conception of rationality in the economics literature is the ‘pursuance of self-
interest’” (Vriend 1996, 264 [emphasis in original]).  This axiom is commonly attributed to 
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Smith (e.g., Stigler 1976), yet should instead be traced to influential claims made by marginalist 
economists such as Francis Edgeworth (1881, p. 16), for whom: “The first principle of 
Economics is that every agent is actuated only be self-interest”.  As Luigino Bruni and Robert 
Sugden (2007: 151-2) explain, Edgeworth views neoclassical economics’ law of the 
diminishing marginal utility of consumption as a variant of founding experimental 
psychologists’ hypothesis of diminished sensitivity and associationist philosopher Alexander 
Bain’s account of psychological hedonism (Edgeworth 1881, pp. 59-62; see Jevons 1866, p. 
284).  Notably, James points to Bain as an exponent of the “old-fashioned pleasure-philosophy” 
which assumes that behaviour is wholly influenced by “the secret solicitancy of pleasure and 
repugnancy of pain” (James 1950b [1890], 550-1).  James refers to this “curiously narrow 
teleological superstition” as “silliness” (ibid) as it ignores the often impulsive nature of 
behaviour (Lewin 1996: 1299).  This contrasts with neoclassical and Austrian economists’ 
assumptions regarding economic actions as outcomes of conscious deliberation, which is also 
contradicted by recent research that confirms the salience of James’s focus upon the importance 
of instincts and habits in understanding individuals’ behaviour. 10 
 
As is well known, James’s emphasis upon habits and instincts is an apparent influence upon 
Thorstein Veblen’s institutionalist critique of neoclassical and Austrian economics, including 
his rejection of their practitioners’ assumptions regarding “passive and substantially inert and 
immutably given human nature”. 11 Veblen’s critique of marginal utility theory and his 
evolutionary account of scientific progress also provide notable points of connection between 
his contributions and those of Smith, including the latter figure’s identification of instincts as 
the origin of the formation of moral rules. 12 Veblen’s (1900, p. 241) ostensible rejection of 
methodological individualism and methodological collectivism also points to the potential 
influence of Smith and James.  Yet while Veblen neglects to place exclusive emphasis upon 
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social determination (Hodgson 1998, p. 419; 426), as is perhaps evident in his rejection of 
hedonistic-associational psychologists’ depictions of human nature “in inert terms”, he is 
similarly critical of the “newer conception” of psychology which “formulates conduct in terms 
of personality” (Veblen 1900, pp. 247-8). 
 
This indicates Veblen’s reluctance to consider the question of human intentionality as a suitable 
subject of inquiry (Veblen 1900, pp. 248-9; Liagouras 2009, pp. 1052-3); an aversion that is 
evidently not shared by Smith and James.  According to Veblen, socialisation processes govern 
the “settled habits of thought common to the generality of men” (Veblen 1909, p. 627; Hodgson 
2007, p. 331).  Consequently, one’s environment “incubates the desires through which ideas of 
personhood cohere in the mind of the individual” (Watson 2012, p. 499).  This is apparent in 
Veblen’s claim that: “the usual basis of self-respect is the respect accorded by one’s 
neighbours.  Only individuals with an aberrant temperament can in the long run retain their 
self-esteem in the face of the disesteem of their fellows” (Veblen 1944 [1899], p. 20).  By 
contrast, and as discussed, Smith and James retain consistent analytical space for individuals’ 
resilient self-images via introspective processes that are both informed by and transcendent to 
their immediate environments.  As Matthew Watson persuasively contends, Smith “defends 
the conception of an autonomous moral sphere by arguing that the instinctive desire to satisfy 
the self about one’s praiseworthiness might always nullify pressures for social conformity 
arising from the economy” (Watson 2012, p. 508).  Smith makes this defence via the impartial 
spectator (Smith 1976 [1790], VI.iii.25); James via the ideal social self, a comparable 
psychological mechanism which he claims enables individuals to withstand similar social 
pressures (James 1950a [1890], pp. 315).  However, while James argues that “our self-feeling 
is within our power” (ibid, pp. 309-11), he - like Smith - does not dislocate this mechanism 
from individuals’ social contexts or locate it exclusively at the level of habit or instinct (see 
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Smith 1976 [1790], III.4.7).  Instead, as Lawlor (2006, p. 342) explains, in James’s account: 
“Individual lives...are complex mixes of self-interest, different habits and roles, all the while 
defined and constrained by the rules of the institutions they represent, but not completely 
determined by them”.   
 
For James, as for Smith, one’s self-feeling and notions of behavioural propriety are established 
without direct appeals to objective philosophical or religious criteria.  While Smith’s distance 
from the theocratic universalism of his peers denotes his emphasis upon self-determination, 
this does not represent doctrinaire advocacy of moral subjectivism or methodological 
individualism.  As A. L. Macfie explains, while Smith employs the latter methodology, “there 
is an implicit social theory which ... directs and dominates all Smith’s thought ... it is not offered 
or argued as a theory of society.  It is rather reflected and inspired by the stream of his inductive 
thought about the nature of individual life in society” (Macfie 1953, pp. 218-9 [emphasis in 
original]).  Indeed, Smith’s thoroughgoing restraint from advocating a fixed moral end-point 
at which society should aim or through which behaviour ought to be evaluated is directly 
informed by his inductive methodology that reflects his commitment to the provisional nature 
of knowledge.  This approach also facilitates Smith’s appeals to different individual and 
cultural articulations of human experience throughout his works, a feature that is comparable 
with James’s intersubjective and provisional account of the development of knowledge that is 
informed by his pragmatist method, which: “turns away from...bad a priori reasons, from fixed 
principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins” (James, 1987 [1907], pp. 508-
10).   
 
The central importance that James attributes to the role of psychological processes in the 
development of such systems is highlighted in The Dilemma of Determinism (DD), where he 
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claims: “when we make theories about the world and discuss them with one another, we do so 
in order to attain a conception of things which shall give us subjective satisfaction” (James, 
1992 [1884], p. 567).  As Ronald Beanblossom (2000, p. 483) explains, it is this emphasis upon 
psychological satisfaction that enables James to justify an individual’s belief in objectivism on 
practical grounds whilst avoiding absolute subjectivism (e.g., James, 1987 [1907], p. 556).  
James rejects the latter approach owing its fostering of fatalism and “ethical indifference”, from 
which he suggests there is “absolutely no possible theoretic escape” (James 1992 [1884], pp. 
585; 587 [emphasis in original]).   Whilst, as noted, he does not deny that absolute truth can be 
attained, James does reject claims that “we can know when we have attained knowing it”.  
Indeed, he further contends that: “There is but one indefectibly perfect truth...that the present 
phenomenon of consciousness exists”.  Beyond this “bare starting-point of knowledge”, 
however: “No concrete test of what is really true has ever been agreed upon...one’s conviction 
that the evidence one goes by is of the real objective brand, is only one more subjective opinion 
added to the lot” (James 1992 [1896], pp. 465-7 [emphasis in original]). 
 
As is widely known, James rejects attempts to attribute consciousness to the soul in PP.  By 
contrast, he argues: “as psychologists, we need not be metaphysical at all...the passing Thought 
itself is the only verifiable thinker, and its empirical connection with the brain-process is the 
ultimate known law”.  This is echoed in his criticisms of the common sense theory of “the 
Scotch school” that includes Francis Wayland, whom James notes “begins his Elements of 
Intellectual Philosophy with the phrase ‘Of the essence of Mind we know nothing’” (James, 
1950a [1890], pp. 346-7 [emphasis in original]; Madden, 1962, p. 348).  As Donald Frey 
explains, Wayland attempts to render Protestant morality compatible with laissez-faire 
economics, interpreting Smith’s invisible hand metaphor as the divine hand of God (Frey 2002, 
p. 229).  Yet this is a misinterpretation on two counts: Smith is neither an advocate of laissez-
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faire or of revealed religion, despite influential claims to the contrary made by scholars such 
as Jacob Viner (1927, p. 205), who argues that the invisible hand provides evidence that “Smith 
definitely commits himself to the theism of his time”.13  Yet, as noted, Smith does not employ 
the metaphor to advocate market fundamentalism and does not concur with his immediate 
peers’ religious views.  Instead, and in a manner that is consistent with his secular account of 
the development of philosophical systems in HA (Kennedy, 2013, p. 469), the invisible hand 
metaphor is invoked to demonstrate the psychological propensities that inadvertently 
contribute towards societal progress, as previously discussed.   
 
Notably, when Smith invokes the metaphor in TMS, he observes that the same “love of art and 
contrivance” that motivates the rich landowners’ inadvertent contributions to societal progress 
also promotes the popular desire for orderly government institutions (Smith 1976 [1790], 
IV.i.11).  Smith also suggests here and in WN that the study of these institutions promotes 
public spirit and stability, as an educated population is “less liable...to the delusions of 
enthusiasm and superstition… [and] more disposed to examine, and more capable of seeing 
through, the interested complaints of faction and sedition”.  This is in direct contrast to the 
political instability that he claims results from instruction provided by “contending religious 
sects”.  Smith’s advocacy of secular education, including in “science and philosophy” - which 
he portrays as “the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition” - is thus in direct 
contrast to the views of a number of his immediate peers, who sought to rectify the perceived 
morally debilitating effects of commercial society upon its supposedly inferior ranks through 
educational schemes informed by allegedly objective standards of virtue derived from 
revelation.14 
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Such schemes are clearly at variance with Smith’s and James’s accounts of individuals’ self-
directed reflections upon the viewpoint of their imagined ideal spectator in the absence of 
appeals to objective standards of propriety.  As Haakonssen (2006, pp. 12-4) explains, Smith’s: 
“concern is to explain how people make moral assessments of the merit of their own and other 
people’s motives and behaviour, and he suggests that this happens by an implicit invocation of 
their notion of ideal propriety”.  This is because, for Smith: “as moral agents, we are acts of 
creative imagination”.  As James similarly contends in Pragmatism: “In our cognitive as well 
as in our active life we are creative.  We add, both to the subject, and to the predicate part of 
reality.  The world stands really malleable…Man engenders truths upon it” (James, 1987 
[1907], p. 599 [emphases in original]).  Consequently, as James (1992 [1891], p.595) states in 
The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life: “there can be no final truth in ethics any more than 
in physics, until the last man has had his experience and his say”.   
 
5. Concluding remarks 
As Erik Angner and George Loewenstein (2012, pp. 644-5) point out, James’s definition of 
psychology as being concerned with “feelings, desires, cognitions, reasonings, and the like” 
(James, 1950a [1890], p.1) clearly illustrates its dissimilarity to neoclassical economics’  
axiomatic assumption regarding the optimal availability and processing of information by self-
interested, utility maximising agents (Gilad et al. 1984, p.5).  Evaluation of the thoroughgoing 
emphasis that James and Smith place upon the role of psychological satisfaction in the 
development of intellectual, material and moral progress, as well as its provisional and 
interconnected nature, also demonstrates their distance from such a claim.  As I have sought to 
argue, James’s suspicion towards reductionist and universalistic assumptions invites direct 
comparison with Smith’s nuanced discussion of human psychology, which is routinely 
downplayed in mainstream accounts of his contribution to economics (Davis 2003).  This is 
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additionally significant given Angner and Loewenstein’s (2012, p. 676) identification of 
behavioural economics as one of the likely routes through which a disciplinary shift away from 
its longstanding neoclassical convictions is to occur.  However, as Esther-Mirjam Sent (2004, 
p.749) explains, neoclassical economics’ axiomatic assumption regarding individual economic 
rationality retains a centrally important place within behavioural economics.15  As this axiom 
reflects and to some extent depends upon a disciplinary separation of economics and 
psychology that Smith and James had no part in (Lewin 1996), any efforts to interrogate the 
relationships between these disciplines and to reintegrate them would benefit from interpreting 
their founding contributions via holistic, non-disciplinary and comparative lenses.  
 
As I have argued, the emphasis which James places upon the psychological basis and 
provisional nature of philosophical knowledge is directly comparable to Smith’s articulation 
of the central role of imaginative striving in its development alongside moral and material 
progress.  As I have also discussed, Smith introduces his two most widely-invoked metaphors 
- the invisible hand and the impartial spectator - to explain that such progress depends upon a 
series of expedient psychological processes.  In so doing he firmly rejects interventions based 
upon claims to objective accounts of truth and morality while illustrating the central role of 
these processes in propelling “the immense machine” of society.  As Smith explains, such a 
machine produces numerous societal benefits when it is allowed to operate in an orderly 
manner.  This, he argues, is ensured by good governance, education and virtuous behaviour, 
which is adjudged as such in relation to the pleasurable psychological feelings that are 
produced by its facilitation of this “smooth and easy” maintenance that in turn provides further 
societal stability, prosperity, and opportunities for moral improvement (Smith, 1976 [1790], 
VII.iii.1.2; IV.1.9-11; IV.2.1).  The significance of such feelings are consistently emphasised 
throughout Smith’s work (e.g., Smith, 1983, II. 134), beginning with his explanation in HA of 
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the shift from polytheism to philosophy in terms of individuals’ desire to avoid psychological 
discomfort.  Smith additionally contends here that efforts to obtain this reassurance are often 
informed by scholars’ engagement in a particular field of inquiry: “who therefore explained to 
themselves the phaenomena, in that which was strange to them, by those in which that which 
was familiar; and with whom, upon that account, the analogy...became the great hinge upon 
which every thing turned” (Smith, 1980, HA, II.12; IV.50).  James is similarly critical of 
excessive usage of analogy in order to support claims to objective truth, which, he contends, 
“is nowhere to be found” (James, 1911, p. 37).  This relates directly to the consistent emphasis 
that is placed upon the role of psychological reassurance in the development of philosophical 
knowledge, including in A Pluralistic Universe, where he argues: “All philosophers... have 
conceived of the whole world after the analogy of some particular feature of it which has 
captivated their attention”, and who thus “carve out order by leaving the disorderly parts out” 
(James, 1987 [1909], pp. 633-9 [emphasis in original]).  This is echoed in WB, where James 
(1992 [1896], pp. 567-8) states: 
 
I myself believe that all the magnificent achievements of mathematical and physical 
science…proceed from our indomitable desire to cast the world into a more rational 
shape in our minds than the shape into which it is thrown there by the crude order of 
our experience… All our scientific and philosophic ideals are altars to unknown gods. 
 
James’s account of the psychological basis and provisional basis of intellectual criteria is thus 
directly comparable to Smith’s explanation of scientific, material and moral progress.   In a 
manner that is strikingly reminiscent of Smith’s impartial spectator metaphor, James argues in 
PP that moral progress can be achieved through introspective reflection upon one’s “ideal 
judge”, an imagined figure who, unlike “interest[ed] and prejudice[d]” onlookers, “can read 
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my qualities...for what they truly are”.  James additionally claims here that: “it is probable that 
individuals differ a good deal in the degree in which they are haunted by this sense of an ideal 
spectator” (James, 1950a [1890], pp. 312-6 [emphasis in original]).  Importantly, Smith also 
conceives of varied imaginative capabilities among individuals, which he suggests can be 
improved through habitual efforts to gain the sympathy of their impartial spectator alongside 
that of their peers; a psychological process that is consistent with his explanation of the ways 
in which commercial interaction enables individuals to develop levels of proficiency in 
persuasion and empathy that assist “fair and deliberate exchange”.  As is also consistent with 
his remarks concerning the material prosperity that attends our successfully interpreting the 
motives and interests of the “butcher, the brewer, [and]...the baker”,  Smith thus invokes the 
impartial spectator to countenance individuals’ moral progress through the development of 
their imaginative abilities regarding evaluation of the propriety of actions as well as the “praise 
or blame” that may be attached to their motivations without recourse to an objective external 
standard.16  
 
Relatedly, Smith is clear that perfect sympathy or complete acquiescence between individuals 
are not realistic aims or are indeed necessary to maintain “the harmony of society”, which can 
instead be provided by individuals’ genuine attempts to sympathise with others (Smith, 1976 
[1790], I.1.36).  This reflects the influence of Roman stoic accounts of practical morality upon 
Smith’s moral philosophy, which informs his recognition that individuals’ attempts to lead 
morally just lives can be influenced by factors such as conceit and the desire for luxury and 
gratification (ibid, VII.ii.4.11).  Consequently, according to Smith, individuals can be 
considered to act in a virtuous manner when they are in harmony with societal standards of 
moral propriety to the extent to which they are currently capable (ibid, I.i.5.5; VII.i.42).  As 
discussed, this is in direct contrast to his contemporaries’ appeals to fixed moral standards to 
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which individuals ought to be directed towards and judged against (e.g., Reid 2010 [1788]).  
As Samuel Fleischacker (2004, pp. 52-3) explains: “the fact that Smith brings proper moral 
judgment so close to what, in ordinary social life, people actually judge to be right and wrong 
means we should not expect him to launch external or transcendental critiques of his society’s 
practices”.  Smith additionally refrains from engaging in critiques of other societies based upon 
comparisons with such practices or invocations of universal moral standards (Haakonssen, 
2006, p. 9).  His aversion to cultural universalism is reiterated in the final Part of TMS, where 
Smith rejects casuists’ attempts to “lay down many precise rules that are to hold good 
unexceptionably in all particular cases” in favour of the methods of “ancient moralists” who 
“only endeavoured to ascertain, first, wherein consists the sentiment of the heart, upon which 
each particular virtue is founded...and, secondly, what is the general way of acting, the ordinary 
tone or conduct to which each of those sentiments would direct us...upon ordinary occasions” 
(Smith, 1976 [1790], VII.iv.7; 3). Smith’s definition of the ‘ethical’ philosopher is therefore 
directly comparable to James’s depiction of a “true philosopher”, who is “not the champion of 
one particular ideal” but who instead: 
 
...must see that there is nothing final in any actually given equilibrium of human ideals, 
but that, as our present laws and customs have fought and conquered other past ones, 
so they will in their turn be overthrown by any newly discovered order which will hush 
up the complaints that they still give rise to, without producing others louder still 
(James, 1992 [1896], p. 611; see Teichgraeber 1981, pp. 118-9). 
 
As I have demonstrated in this paper, Smith’s and James’s explanations of the psychological 
basis of  intellectual, material and moral progress and its provisional character reflect a number 
of important connections between their work.  That these connections are often overlooked is 
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surprising given their status as the founders of modern economics and psychology and the 
ongoing interest that their contributions continue to stimulate across the academy, including 
among behavioural economists and neuroeconomists.  Unlike the majority of economists who 
refer to Smith via WN (Wight 2002; Glaze 2015) these scholars tend to draw inspiration from 
TMS and James’s PP (e.g., Ashraf, Camerer and Loewenstein, 2005; Monterosso and Ainslie, 
2007; Zak, 2011a; 2011b).  As I have shown, evaluating Smith’s and James’s work in a more 
thoroughly holistic manner not only reveals consistent points of connection between their 
insights but also demonstrates the distance between these and reductive explanations of 
economic behaviour provided by neoclassical economics, at times via reference to similarly 
reductive accounts of Smith’s work.  Efforts to move beyond such explanations and to 
reconnect economics and psychology would therefore benefit greatly from looking again at 
their founders’ contributions in this manner; a process that this discussion has attempted to go 
some way towards encouraging. 
 
Notes  
1 See Barbalet 2008; Lawlor 2006. 
2 Definitions of neoclassical economics are at times controversial. See Aspromourgos 1986; 
Colander 2000; Lawson 2013; Morgan 2016; Morgan 2015.  
3 Smith, 1983, ii.133-4; Smith, 1976 (1790), VII.ii.4.14; see also Twomey 1998, pp. 437-8. 
4 James, 1902, pp.444-5 cited in Gramsci, 1971, p. 373, footnote 68. 
5 The dedication reads: “To My Old Friend, Charles Sanders Peirce, To whose philosophic 
comradeship in old times and to whose writings in more recent years I owe more incitement 
and help than I can express or repay” (James, 1992 [1896], p. 446). See also Lawlor, 2006, pp. 
325-7.  
6 Peirce, C. S., 1905. ‘Issues of Pragmaticism’. The Monist, 15 (4), 481-499 cited in Lane, 
2007, p. 552.  See also Lawlor, 2006, p. 325. 
7 C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (eds.), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1958, vol. VI, p.485 cited in Scheffler, 1974, p. 113. 
8 James, W., 1978 (1876) Essays in Philosophy, p. 4, edited by Burkhardt, F., Bowers, F. and 
Skrupskelis, I. K., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, cited in Leary, 1992, p. 158.  
9 Olson, R. S., (1975) Scottish Philosophy and British Physics, 1750-1880, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, p. 123 cited Smith, 1980, p.12.  
10 Hodgson 2007, p. 332; Twomey 1998, pp. 436-7.  While marginalist assumptions regarding 
hedonism have lost influence upon contemporary economists’ interpretations of individuals’ 
behaviour, their assumptions concerning utility maximising individuals have been retained 
(Lewin 1996, p.1318). 
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11 Veblen 1998 (1898), p. 411; Veblen 1900, p. 242; Hodgson 1998, p. 425; Lewin 1996, p. 
1302; Liagouras 2009, p. 1050; Twomey 1998, p. 440. 
12 See Smith 1976 (1790), III.4.7-8; Smith 1976 (1776), I.iv.13; Veblen 1909; Veblen 1900; 
White 2002; Wight 2009. 
13 See Smith, 1976 (1790), III.3.9; Morrow, 1928, p. 165.  
14 Smith, 1976 (1776), V.i.f.61-V.i.g.14. See Davis, 2003; Haakonssen, 1996; Hill, 1997; 
Lehmann, 1971. 
15 Sent 2004, p.749. See Hargreaves Heap 2013; Kahneman 2003; Lawson 2013. 
16 Smith 1976 (1776), I.ii.2; Smith, 1976 (1790), III.3.25; III.4.9; Broadie, 2006, p.182; 
Griswold, 1999, pp. 141-2; Ross, 1995, p. 164. 
 
References 
Ahmad, S., 1990. Adam Smith’s Four Invisible Hands, History of Political Economy, vol. 22, 
no. 1, pp.137-44 
Aspromourgos, T., 1986. On the origins of the term ‘neoclassical’, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, vol. 10, no. 3, 265-70 
Barbalet, J. M., 2004. William James: Pragmatism, Social Psychology and Emotions.  
European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 7, no. 3, 337-54 
Barbalet, J. M., 2008. Pragmatism and economics: William James’ contribution, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, vol. 32, no.5, 797-810 
Beanblossom, R. E., 2000. James and Reid: Meliorism vs. Metaphysics, American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 74, no. 3, 471-90 
Berry, C. J., 2006. Smith and Science, pp.112-135, in Haakonssen, K. (ed.),  The Cambridge 
Companion to Adam Smith, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press  
Bird, G. H., 1997. Moral philosophy and the development of morality, pp. 260-81 in Putnam, 
R. A. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to William James, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press 
Broadie, A., 2006. Sympathy and the Impartial Spectator, pp. 158-88, in Haakonssen, K. (ed.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
Bruni, L., Sugden, R., 2007. The Road Not Taken: How Psychology Was Removed From 
Economics, and How it Might Be Brought Back, The Economic Journal, vol. 117, January, 
146-73 
Clark, J. M., 1918. Economics and Modern Psychology: 1, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 
26, no. 1, 1-30 
Colander, D., 2000. The Death of Neoclassical Economics, Journal of the History of Economic 
Thought, vol. 22, no. 2, 127-43 
Cormier, H., 2001. The Truth is What Works: William James, Pragmatism, and the Seed of 
Death, Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield 
Davis, J. B., 2011. Individuals and Identity in Economics, New York, NY, Cambridge 
University Press 
Davis, G. F., 2003. Philosophical Psychology and Economic Psychology in David Hume and 
Adam Smith,  History of Political Economy, vol. 35, no. 2, 269-304 
Dow, S. C., 2011. Cognition, market sentiment and financial instability, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, vol. 35, no. 2, 233-49 
Earl, P. E., 2005. Economics and psychology in the twenty-first century, Cambridge Journal 
of Economics, vol. 29, no. 6, 909-26 
Edgeworth, F. Y., 1881. Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics 
to the Moral Sciences, London, C. Kegan Paul & Co. 
Fleischacker, S., 2004. On Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations: A Philosophical Companion, 
Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press 
27 
 
Fleischacker, S., 1999. A Third Concept of Liberty: Judgment and Freedom in Kant and Adam 
Smith, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press 
Frey, D. E., 2002. Francis Wayland’s 1830s Textbooks: Evangelical Ethics and Political 
Economy,  Journal of the History of Economic Thought, vol. 24, no. 2, 215-31 
Glaze, S. (2015) Schools Out: Adam Smith and Pre-disciplinary International Political 
Economy, New Political Economy, vol. 20, no. 5, 679-701 
Grampp, W. D., 2000. What Did Smith Mean by the Invisible Hand? Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 108, no. 3, pp. 441-65 
Grampp, W. D., 1948. Adam Smith and the Economic Man, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 
56, no. 4, pp. 315-36 
Gramsci, A., 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, edited and 
translated by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith, New York, NY, International Publishers 
Griswold, C. L., 1999. Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 
Haakonssen, K., 1996. Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish 
Enlightenment, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
Haakonssen, K., 2006. Introduction: The Coherence of Adam Smith’s Thought, pp. 1-21 in 
Haakonssen, K. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 
Hands, D. W., 2010. Economics, psychology and the history of consumer choice theory, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 34, no. 4, 633-48 
Hargreaves Heap., S. P., 2013. What is the meaning of behavioural economics?, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, vol. 37, no. 5, 985-1000 
Hill, L. E., 1997. Adam Ferguson and the Paradox of Progress and Decline, History of Political 
Thought, vol. 28, no. 4, 677-706 
Hodgson, G. M., 2007. The Revival of Veblenian Economics, Journal of Economic Issues, vol. 
41, no. 2, pp. 325-40 
Hodgson, G. M., 1998. On the evolution of Thorstein Veblen's evolutionary economics, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 22, no. 4, 415-31 
James, W., 1992 (1898). Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results, pp. 1077-97 in 
Myers, G. E. (ed.), William James: Writings 1878-1899, New York, NY, Library of America, 
1077-97 
James, W., 1992 (1896). The Will To Believe, pp. 457-79 in Myers, G. E. (ed.), William James: 
Writings 1878-1899, New York, NY, Library of America  
James, W., 1992 (1891). The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, pp. 595-617 in Myers, G. 
E. (ed.), William James: Writings 1878-1899, New York, NY: Library of America 
James, W., 1992 (1884). The Dilemma of Determinism, pp.566-94 in Myers, G. E. (ed.), 
William James: Writings 1878-1899, New York, NY, Library of America 
James, W., 1992 (1882). The Sentiment of Rationality, pp. 504-39 in Myers, G. E. (ed.), 
William James: Writings 1878-1899, New York, NY, Library of America 
James, W., 1987 (1911). The Meaning of Truth, pp. 821-978 in Kuklick, B. (ed.), William 
James: Writings 1902-1910, New York, NY, Library of America 
James, W., 1987 (1909). A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 625-820 in Kuklick, B. (ed.), William 
James: Writings 1902-1910, New York, NY, Library of America 
James, W., 1987 (1907). Pragmatism, pp. 479-624 in Kuklick, B. (ed.), William James: 
Writings 1902-1910, New York, NY, Library of America 
James, W., 1987 (1902). The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 1-478 in Kuklick, B. (ed.), 
William James: Writings 1902-1910, New York, NY, Library of America 
James, W., 1950a (1890). The Principles of Psychology Volume One, New York, Dover 
James, W., 1950b (1890). The Principles of Psychology Volume Two, New York, Dover 
28 
 
James, W., 1912. Essays in Radical Empiricism, New York, NY, Longman’s, Green and Co. 
James, W., 1904. The Pragmatic Method, The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific 
Methods, vol. 1, no. 25, 673-87 
James, W., 1890. The Hidden Self, Scribner’s Magazine, vol. 7, no. 3, 361-373 
Jevons, W. S., 1866. A Brief Account of a General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy, 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, no. 29, 282-7  
Kahneman, D. 2003. A psychological perspective on economics, American Economic Review, 
vol. 93, no. 2, 162-8 
Kennedy, G., 2013. Adam Smith on Religion, pp. 464-84, in Berry, C. J., Paganelli, M. P., 
Smith, C. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Adam Smith, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
Kim, K., 2012. Adam Smith’s ‘History of Astronomy’ and view of science, Cambridge Journal 
of Economics, vol. 36, no.4, 799-820 
Kubo. S., 2014. D. Stewart and J. R. McCulloch: economic methodology and the making of 
orthodoxy, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 38, no. 4, 925–43 
Lane, R., 2007. Peirce’s Modal Shift: From Set Theory to Pragmaticism, Journal of the History 
of Philosophy, vol. 45, no. 4, 551-76 
Lawlor, M. S., 2006. William James’s psychological pragmatism: habit, belief and purposive 
human behaviour, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 30, no. 3, 321-45 
Lawson, T., 2013. What is this ‘school’ called neoclassical economics?, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, vol. 37, no. 5, 947-83 
Leary, D. E., 1992. William James and the Art of Human Understanding, American 
Psychologist, vol. 47, no. 2, 152-60 
Lehmann, C., 1971. Henry Home, Lord Kames, and the Scottish Enlightenment, The Hague, 
Martinus Nijhoff  
Lewin, S. B., 1996. Economics and psychology: Lessons for our own day from the early 
twentieth century, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 34, no.3, 1293-1323 
Liagouras, G., 2009. Socio-economic evolution and Darwinism in Thorstein Veblen: a critical 
appraisal, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 33, no. 6, 1047–64 
Lunt, P., 1996. Rethinking the relationship between economics and psychology, Journal of 
Economic Psychology, vol. 17, no. 2, 275-87 
Macfie, A. L., 1953. Adam Smith’s Moral Sentiments as Foundation for His Wealth of Nations. 
Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 11, no. 3, 209-28  
Madden, E. H., 1962. Francis Wayland and the Limits of Moral Responsibility, Proceedings 
of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 106, no. 4, 348-59   
Mandeville, B., 1998 (1732). The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Publick Benefits, 
Indianapolis, IN, Liberty Fund 
Monterosso, J., Ainslie, G., 2007. The behavioral economics of will in recovery from addiction, 
Drug and Alcohol Dependence, vol. 90S, S100–S111 
Montes, L., 2004. Adam Smith in Context: A Critical Reassessment of Some Central 
Components of His Thought, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan 
Morgan, J., 2016. What is Neoclassical Economics? Debating the origins, meaning and 
significance, Oxon, Routledge   
Morgan, J., 2015. What’s in a name? Tony Lawson on neoclassical economics and heterodox 
economics, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 39, no. 3, 843-65 
Morrow, G. R., 1928. Adam Smith: Moralist and Philosopher, pp. 156-179, in Clark, J. M., 
Douglas, P. H., Hollander, J. H., Morrow, G. R., Palyi, M. and Viner, J. (eds.), Adam Smith 
1776-1926, Lectures to Commemorate the Sesquicentennial of the Publication of “The Wealth 
of Nations”, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press 
29 
 
Moscati, I., 2013. Were Jevons, Menger, and Walras Really Cardinalists? On the Notion of 
Measurement in Utility Theory, Psychology, Mathematics, and Other Disciplines, 1870-1910, 
History of Political Economy, vol. 45, no. 3, 373-414 
Pack, S., 1991. Capitalism as a Moral System: Adam Smith's Critique of the Free Market 
Economy, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Peirce, C. S., 1958. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, volume V, edited by C. 
Hartshorne and P. Weiss, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press 
Putnam, H., 1997. James’s Theory of Truth, pp. 166-185, in Putnam, R. A. (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to William James, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
Reid, T., 2010 (1788). Essays on the Active Powers of Man, edited by Haakonssen, K. and 
Harris, J. A., Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press 
Ross, I. S., 1995. The Life of Adam Smith, Oxford, Clarendon Press 
Russell, B. A. W., 1946. A History of Western Philosophy, London: George Allen & Unwin  
Scheffler, I., 1974. Four Pragmatists: A Critical Introduction to Peirce, James, Mead, and 
Dewey, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Sent, E. M., 2004. Behavioral Economics: How Psychology Made Its (Limited) Way Back Into 
Economics, History of Political Economy, vol. 36, no. 4, 735-60 
Simon, H., 1959. Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science, 
American Economic Review, vol. 49, no. 3, 253-83 
Skrupskelis, I. K., Berkeley, E. M. (eds.), 1993. The Correspondence of William James Volume 
2: William and Henry, 1885-1896, Charlottesville, VA: The University Press of Virginia 
Smith, A., 1983. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, edited by Bryce, J. C., Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 
Smith, A., 1980. Essays on Philosophical Subjects, edited by Wightman, W. P. D., Bryce, J. 
C. and Ross, I. S., Oxford, Oxford University Press 
Smith, A., 1978. Lectures on Jurisprudence, edited by Meek, R. L., Raphael, D. D., and Stein, 
P. G., Oxford, Oxford University Press  
Smith, A., 1976 (1790). The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 6th edition, edited by Raphael, D. D. 
and Macfie, A. L., Oxford, Oxford University Press 
Smith, A., 1976 (1776). An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, edited 
by Campbell, R. H. and Skinner, A. S., Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Soros, G., 1998. The Crisis of Global Capitalism, Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Company 
Sprigge, T. L. S., 1997. James, aboutness, and his British critics, pp. 125-144 in Putnam, R. A. 
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to William James, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press  
Stigler, G., 1976. The Successes and Failures of Professor Smith, The Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 84, no. 6, 1199-1213  
Stiglitz, D. J. (2009) Moving Beyond Market Fundamentalism to a More Balanced Economy, 
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, vol. 80, no. 3, 345-60 
Taylor, M. P., and Mankiw, N. G., 2014. Economics, 3rd edition, Boston, MA, Cengage 
Learning 
Teichgraeber, R. T., 1981. Rethinking Das Adam Smith Problem, The Journal of British 
Studies, vol. 20, no. 2, 106-23 
Twomey, P., 1998. Reviving Veblenian economic psychology, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, vol. 22, no. 4, 433-48 
Veblen, T. B., 1998 (1898). Why is economics not an evolutionary science?, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, vol. 22, no.4, 403-14 
Veblen, T. B., 1994 (1899). The Theory of the Leisure Class, New York, NY, Dover 
Publications 
Veblen, T. B., 1909. The Limitations of Marginal Utility, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
17, no. 9, 620-36 
30 
 
Veblen, T. B., 1900. The preconceptions of economic science: III, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. XIV, no. 2, 240-69 
Vriend, N. J., 1996. Rational behavior and economic theory, Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization, vol. 29, no. 2, 263-85 
Watson, M. G., 2012. Desperately seeking social approval: Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen and 
the moral limits of capitalist culture, The British Journal of Sociology, vol. 63, no. 3, 491-512 
Wayland, F., 1835. The Elements of Moral Science, New York, NY, Cooke and Co. 
White, M. V., 2002. Doctoring Adam Smith: The Fable of the Diamonds and Water Paradox, 
History of Political Economy, vol. 34, no. 4, 659-83 
Wight, J. B., 2009. Adam Smith on Instincts, Affection, and Informal Learning: Proximate 
Mechanisms in Multilevel Selection, Review of Social Economy, vol. 67, no. 1, 95-113 
Wight, J. B., 2002. The Rise of Adam Smith: Articles and Citations, 1970-1997, History of 
Political Economy vol. 34, no. 1, 55-82 
Winch, D., 1997. Adam Smith’s Problems and Ours, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 44, no. 4, 384-402  
Wrenn, M. V., 2015. Agency and neoliberalism, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 39, no. 
5, 1231-43 
Zak, P. K., 2011a. The physiology of moral sentiments, Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, vol. 77, no. 1, 53-65 
Zak, P. K., 2011b. Moral Markets, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 77, 
no.2, 212-33 
